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In a time of global warming, of financial crisis, and of a crisis in food 
availability we need to ask how the food supply can be secured into the 
future. The present article considers the extent to which food security is at 
risk and considers how this risk is currently addressed through 
international and domestic trade regulation. It gives particular attention to 
the problems of the poor in the face of increasing biofuel production. It 
argues that sustainable results can only come about if the interests of the 
most vulnerable groups of the community are addressed at the international 
level. In particular, the current regulatory frameworks need to be enforced 
in order to ensure the food security of the world’s population. 
I INTRODUCTION 
During the writing of this article, the number of people suffering from chronic 
hunger steadily increased to reach an estimated total of 1020 million in 2009. 
As a result, for the first time in human history, more than one billion people 
are undernourished. Still, the final declaration of the recent World Food 
Summit in November 2009 does not promote any new ways to end hunger.1 
At the same time, glaciers are melting away and temperatures rising at an 
unprecedented speed, resulting in 5 per cent of the world’s population losing 
their homes because of flooding. The estimated costs of global warming may, 
according to the Stern Report in 2006, reach 20 per cent of GDP, depending 
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1 Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), ‘More People Than Ever are 
Victims of Hunger’ (background note to press release, 19 June 2009) 1 
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on how long the world continues to hesitate to take action.2 Nevertheless, it 
seems that, with the development of the financial crisis, the world has, after a 
brief period of shock, become used to such large numbers. Millions have been 
replaced by billions and aid packages for businesses affected by the financial 
crisis have meanwhile reached astronomical proportions. And yet, at a point 
in history where climate change, a food crisis and a financial crisis are about 
to add up to a major human crisis, the fundamental question remains of how 
food supply can be secured and what role international trade law can play in 
this regard. 
II SECURITY OF FOOD SUPPLY IN THE CURRENT FOOD 
 CRISES 
A The Facts 
From 2007 to June 2008, the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) 
average food price index rose by 53 per cent. There are several reasons for 
high food prices: weather conditions, international stock levels, increased 
global food demand, higher oil prices, the biofuel factor, tariffs and policies, 
developments in financial markets and the weakness of the US dollar.3  
After record levels of food prices in summer 2008, there has recently been a 
sharp fall.4 Still, in contrast to global food prices which have moderated in 
recent months, domestic prices remain much higher than in previous years and 
show few signs of abating.5 It is therefore obvious that the recent decline in 
global prices must not be misinterpreted as the solution to hunger and poverty. 
In addition, new production statistics reveal that producers in developing 
countries did not participate in the gains from higher prices, since their supply 
response was small in 2007 and virtually zero in 2008.6 Given that food 
accounts for a major part of household expenditure for the poor, food prices 
directly affect their food security. 
                                                 
2 Lord Todd Stern et al, Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change (October 2006) 
<http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/stern_review_report.htm> at 17 April 2009. 
3 See Alessandro Flammini, Biofuels and the Underlying Causes of High Food Prices (October 
2008) <http://www.fao.org/bioenergy/48659/en/> at 17 April 2009. 
4 See FAO, Food Price Index (2009) <http://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/FoodPricesIndex 
/en/> at 17 April 2009. 
5 The World Bank, Rising Food and Fuel Prices: Addressing the Risks to Future Generations 
(2008) 2 <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEVCOMMEXT/Resources/Food-Fuel.pdf> at 
17 April 2009. 
6 FAO, Food Outlook, Global Market Analysis (November 2008) 61 <ftp://ftp. 
fao.org/docrep/fao/011/ai474e/ai474e00.pdf> at 17 April 2009. 
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Any discussion about a food crisis inevitably raises the issue of food aid. 
Statistics show that food aid is not only declining but is also unrelated to food 
crises. Instead, there is a correlation between low food prices and surplus 
production on the one hand, and food aid on the other. According to the 
United Nations World Food Programme, global food aid deliveries declined 
by 15 per cent in 2007 to 5.9 million tons, thus reaching their lowest level 
since 1961.7 At the same time food prices were high. Competition therefore is 
an important issue, and we know that cheap imported food aid may destroy 
local markets to an extent which additionally jeopardises food security.  
B Legal Concept of Food Security 
In many parts of the world, agricultural growth will play a key role in 
addressing the current food crisis. This objective of alleviating food shortages 
could be achieved by contributing to overall economic growth and by 
increased joint international efforts to reach the first Millennium Development 
Goal of halving the proportion of poor and hungry people by 2015.8 The 
Preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement9 explicitly addresses ‘development’ as 
an overall objective of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and names 
international trade as an instrument for achieving this goal. Since food 
security is an essential part of development, WTO members have obligations 
concerning food security in their own countries as well as abroad.10   
‘Food security’ is a key element in poverty reduction strategies. Besides 
addressing the availability of food, the concept also covers diverse elements 
such as people’s access to food, the capacity of farmers to survive on what 
they produce and the ability to comply with cultural food requirements.11 At 
the international level, food security is addressed from the individual’s 
perspective, and includes a right to safe food.12 The most widely accepted 
definition of food security can be found in the 1996 World Food Summit 
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– Mission Impossible?’ (2007) 40(4) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1039, 1056–7. 
11 Marsha Echols, Food Safety and the WTO: The Interplay of Culture, Science, and 
Technology (2001) 17–18, 29–30. 
12 Ibid 27. 
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Declaration13 and in the World Bank’s seminal 1986 Report on World 
Hunger, which defines food security as a situation in which ‘all people, at all 
times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious 
food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and 
healthy life.’14  
The legal notion of food security has four aspects, with all of them being 
subject to a variety of external factors. The first aspect is the availability of 
food, which is determined by domestic production, import capacity, the 
existence of food stocks and food aid. The second is access to food, which 
depends on levels of poverty, the purchasing power of households, prices and 
the existence of transport and market infrastructure and food distribution 
systems. The third aspect – stability of supply and access – may be affected 
by weather, price fluctuations, human-induced disasters and a variety of 
political and economic factors. The fourth aspect is safe and healthy food 
utilisation, which depends on care and feeding, food safety and quality, access 
to clean water, to health care and to sanitation.15  
This paper will analyse the role of international and domestic regulations in 
securing food supply. The focus will be on the interface between international 
law, especially international trade law, and domestic regulation. A brief 
discussion of the legal framework for trade in agriculture and for food security 
will be followed by an account of recent developments in this field, including 
the Doha Round of the WTO. To illustrate the potential impact of domestic 
policies and their relation to international law, the example of biofuels will be 
discussed in the fifth Part of this paper. Finally, some options for 
policymakers to overcome the diagnosed deficits will be suggested in the 
concluding Part.  
III FOOD SECURITY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 
A Agreement on Agriculture 
The WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) addresses one of the most 
sensitive areas in international trade law. In industrialised countries, 
                                                 
13 FAO, World Food Summit Plan of Action, 13 November 1996, FAO Doc. W3613/E, [1].  
14 Schlomo Reutlinger et al, Poverty and Hunger: Issues and Options for Food Security in 
Developing Countries; A World Bank Policy Study (1986) 1. 
15 FAO, The State of Food and Agriculture 2008: Biofuels: Prospects, Risks and Opportunities 
(2008) 72; The Right to Adequate Food (Art 11): General Comment 12, UN CESCR, 20th 
sess, UN Doc E/C.12/1999/5 (1999). 
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agriculture is a generally heavily subsidised industry. Therefore, the AoA 
attempts to establish ‘a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system’ 
through ‘substantial progressive reduction in agricultural support and 
protection’.16 Liberalisation of trade in agriculture is seen as the key 
instrument in establishing this system. It is built on three pillars which are 
relevant to food security.17 
1 Tariffication 
In line with the general principles of the WTO agreements, existing barriers in 
domestic law need to be first converted into tariffs (tariffication of non-tariff 
barriers) and then reduced.18 Import protection is thereby limited to tariffs and 
tariff quotas. This does not, however, automatically imply that import 
protection is actually reduced. Moreover, in the context of food security it is 
important to note that the predominant or staple food in the traditional diet of 
a developing country may be exempted from this obligation.19  
2 Domestic Support 
The second pillar of the AoA addresses domestic support. Conceptually, there 
are two categories of domestic support: support with little or no distorting 
effect on trade, and trade-distorting support. Support measures which distort 
are subject to reduction commitments. Nevertheless, article 6 of the AoA 
exempts a number of measures from the reduction commitments, with the so 
called ‘Green Box’ measures being defined in Annex 2 of the AoA. Green 
Box measures are measures with minimal impact on trade.  
The first exemption allows members to provide product-specific support up to 
a de minimis threshold, which is set at five per cent of agricultural production 
for developed countries and ten per cent for developing countries.  
A second set of exempted measures includes government service programmes 
which benefit agriculture and the rural community. Such programmes may 
include programmes of pest and disease control, support for training and 
information dissemination, and the provision of infrastructure such as 
drinking water, or of research programmes. 
                                                 
16 Agreement on Agriculture; Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organisation, opened for signature 15 April 1994, 1867 UNTS 410, Annex 1A, Legal 
Instruments – Results of the Uruguay Round (entered into force 1 January 1995) (‘AoA’). 
17 Kaufmann and Heri, above n 10, 1043–7; Christine Kaufmann and Mirina Grosz, ‘Poverty, 
Hunger and International Trade: What’s Law Got to Do with It? Current Mechanisms and the 
Doha Development Agenda’ (2008) 51 German Yearbook of International Law, 75–109. 
18 AoA, art 4. 
19 AoA, art 5. 
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Of immediate relevance for food security is the exemption given to food aid. 
It includes, for instance, public stockholding for food security purposes, 
subject to compliance with specific requirements.20 Food aid in the form of a 
domestic food-aid programme for people in need is exempt as well, provided 
that the government buys products at ‘current market prices’, and that the 
financing and administration of the aid is transparent.  
Finally, direct payments can become relevant in the food context and be 
exempted from the reduction commitments. This will occur when they are 
granted for relief from natural disasters, as structural adjustment assistance, 
under environmental programmes, or under regional assistance programmes. 
In order to be exempt such payments must not be linked to current production 
levels or prices (decoupling).  
While the Green Box applies to both developed and developing countries, 
special treatment is accorded to developing countries with regard to 
governmental stockholding programmes for food security purposes and 
subsidised food prices for urban and rural poor. The general criteria for 
special treatment are that the measures must have no, or at most minimal, 
trade-distorting effects or effects on production. They must be provided 
through a publicly-funded government programme not involving transfers 
from consumers and must not have the effect of providing price support to 
producers. 
3 Export Competition 
The third pillar of the AoA is the commitment to reduce export subsidies. 
Given the correlation between production surpluses and food aid this pillar is 
of particular relevance in tackling the current food crisis.  
The AoA limits the use of export subsidies to specific situations mentioned in 
article 9. Article 9.1 lists the six types of export subsidies that are subject to a 
reduction commitment. Existing export subsidies must be reduced, and no 
new export subsidies must be introduced. Developing countries are subject to 
fewer obligations in this regard, and enjoy longer implementation periods. 
Least-developed countries are under no obligation to reduce whichever export 
subsidies they may have.  
A number of provisions seek to accommodate what the preamble of the AoA 
refers to as ‘non-trade concerns’, among which ‘food security’ is explicitly 
mentioned. For example article 12 paragraph 1 of the AoA requires countries 
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2009 TRADE REGULATIONS TO SECURE THE FOOD SUPPLY 239 
to consider food security in importing countries whenever exports are to be 
reduced or prohibited. 
B Marrakesh Decision on Least-Developed and Net-
Food Importing Developing Countries  
During the Uruguay Round, negotiators were concerned that the agricultural 
reform could have negative effects on developing countries by reducing the 
available supplies of basic foodstuffs from external sources on reasonable 
terms and conditions, and by creating short-term difficulties in the financing 
of normal levels of commercial imports. Several analyses had shown that the 
reform process was likely to increase food import bills as world prices for 
basic foodstuffs were expected to rise, and that the affected countries could 
become more dependent on food imports, with food aid declining at the same 
time.21 
The response was the Marrakesh Decision on Measures Concerning the 
Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Programme on Least Developed 
(LDCs) and Net-Food-Importing Developing Countries (NFIDCs).22 The 
Marrakesh Decision included four response mechanisms: (1) the provision of 
food aid at an adequate level to meet the needs of developing countries; (2) 
short-term financing facilities for developing countries in order to allow them 
to maintain normal levels of commercial imports; (3) favourable terms for 
agricultural export credits;23 and (4) the provision of technical and financial 
assistance to improve the agricultural productivity and infrastructure of the 
developing country.24  
However, this decision has not been satisfactorily implemented. As a result, 
the Doha WTO Ministerial Conference included the Marrakesh Decision as 
one of the implementation issues.25 From a food security perspective, the 
                                                 
21 FAO, The Right to Food Guidelines: Information Papers and Case Studies (2006) 66–7 
<http://www.fao.org/docs/eims/upload/214344/RtFG_Eng_draft_03.pdf> at 16 April 2009. 
22 Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Programme 
on Least-Developed and NetFood-Importing Developing Countries; Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organisation, opened for signature 15 April 1994, Decisions 
adopted by the Trade Negotiations Committee – Results of the Uruguay Round, 1867 UNTS 
60 (entered into force 1 January 1995) (‘Marrakesh Decision’). 
23 This would imply that any agreement relating to agricultural export credits makes appropriate 
provision for differential treatment in favour of least-developed and net food-importing 
developing countries. 
24 Ibid arts 3–5. 
25 Ramesh Sharma and Panos Konandreas, ‘WTO Provisions in the Context of Responding to 
Soaring Food Prices, FAO Commodity and Trade Policy Research’ (Working Paper No 25, 
FAO Commodity and Trade Policy Research, 2008) 13. 
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Marrakesh Decision is important because of its call for ‘a level of food aid 
commitments sufficient to meet the legitimate needs of developing countries 
during the reform programme’.26 Thereby, the Marrakesh Decision 
acknowledges that increasing welfare through trade liberalisation is coupled 
with an increasing legitimate need for assistance of the countries harmed by 
the process.27 
C Conclusion: Food Security at Risk  
Obviously, the current food crisis has been triggered by various factors. The 
failure of the AoA is one of them. 
A critical evaluation of the AoA shows that one of the key objectives – 
improved market access for developing countries – has not been achieved. 
With markets in developed countries still being largely closed to products 
from developing countries, there has been no incentive in these latter 
countries to substantially increase production. In turn, this initiates a vicious 
circle of dependence on food imports, with the effect of further weakening 
domestic production and food security in developing countries. 
Second, the AoA did not succeed in sufficiently cutting domestic subsidies. 
As a result, domestic production in developed countries increased,28 with the 
surplus being sold internationally at prices which producers in developing 
countries cannot compete with. While the resulting fall in prices seems to be 
beneficial in the short term, in the long term the competitiveness of farmers in 
developing countries will be impaired.29  
With regard to export subsidies, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to 
Food, Olivier de Schutter, rightly diagnosed their detrimental effect on 
domestic production in developing countries, although their reduction had 
been praised as one of the major achievements of the Uruguay Round.30 Since 
                                                 
26 Marrakesh Decision, Decisions Adopted by the Trade Negotiations Committee – Results of 
the Uruguay Round, 1867 UNTS 60, para 3 (entered into force 1 January 1995).  
27 Kerstin Mechlem, ‘Harmonizing Trade in Agriculture and Human Rights: Options for the 
Integration of the Right to Food into the Agreement on Agriculture’ (2006) 10 Max Planck 
Yearbook of United Nations Law 127, 160.   
28 See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Agricultural 
Policies in OECD Countries: At a Glance (2008). 
29 See M Ataman Aksoy and Aylin Isik-Dikmelik, ‘Are Low Food Prices Pro-Poor? Net Food 
Buyers and Sellers in Low-Income Countries’ (Working Paper No 4642, World Bank Policy 
Research, 2008). 
30 Olivier de Schutter, Promotion and Protection of all Human Rights, Civil, Political, 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, including the Right to Development: Mission to the 
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the reduction commitments are not combined with obligations to collaborate 
internationally in preventing price volatility, developing countries are not in a 
position to effectively compete with developed nations31 which again results 
in negative effects on food security. 
Finally, the Marrakesh Decision in theory provides for the measures which, 
according to experts, might have mitigated the ongoing food crisis, yet they 
have not been implemented: 
Another risk is that the net food buyers are made vulnerable to increases in 
prices, particularly since many developing States have little of no safety 
nets to protect the poorest segments of the population from such impacts. 
The Marrakesh Decision should insure net food-importing developing 
countries against this risk, but the answer it provides remains partial. For 
this decision to be fully effective, it would need to include a mechanism to 
systematically monitor the impact of the AoA reform process on the 
NFIDCs; it would need to define the notion of ‘adequate supplies’ of basic 
foodstuffs (which, under the decision, NFIDCs should be able to obtain 
from external sources ‘on reasonable terms and conditions’ throughout the 
reform process) by reference to the need to ensure that each individual has 
access at all times to adequate food or to means for its procurement – i.e., 
that the increased prices which may result from the reform process shall not 
result in violations of the right to food; and it would need to be fully 
implemented.32 
The question therefore remains: to what extent can the Doha Round contribute 
to food security and thereby mitigate the food crisis?  
IV STATE OF AFFAIRS IN THE ONGOING DOHA ROUND33 
A The Doha Round as a Development Round 
With the new millennium, global awareness of the alarming dimension of 
worldwide poverty and food insecurity increased. During the first United 
Nations Decade for the Eradication of Poverty (1997–2006), the ‘Millennium 
Development Goals and Targets’ (MDGs) were declared by the member states 
of the United Nations (UN). They reaffirm the need for global cooperation to 
                                                                                                                    
World Trade Organisation, UN HRC, 10th sess, UN Doc A/HRC/10/5/Add.2 (2009). The 
Human Rights Council supported de Schutter’s conclusions: Resolution 10/12, The Right to 
Food, 26 March 2009, UN Doc A/HRC/10/L.11, paras 19, 21, 26. 
31 de Schutter, above n 30, para 43. 
32 Ibid para 45. 
33 This Part draws on Kaufmann and Grosz, above n 17. 
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deal with the key challenges facing the world.34 The first of the MDGs 
addresses the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger. Its first target is to 
halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less 
than US$1 a day. The second target is to achieve full and productive 
employment and decent work for all, and the third target is to halve, between 
1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger. The eighth 
of the MDGs proposes establishing a global partnership for development. It 
states that, by the year 2015, an open trading and financial system that is rule-
based, predictable and non-discriminatory shall have been developed. The 
needs of LDCs, in particular, shall be addressed.   
The MDGs are not legally binding and accordingly have not yet reached the 
level of priority which they deserve among member states. In addition, the 
current food crisis puts at risk the small progress already achieved, especially 
with regard to malnutrition and schooling.35 Still, at the policy level, the 
MDGs serve as a reference for including concrete development goals in 
several international instruments. This was the case for the Doha Agenda. At 
the Doha Ministerial Meeting in Qatar on 14 November 2001, a new round of 
multilateral trade negotiations was launched, with an explicit focus on the 
development dimension of international trade.36   
The Ministerial Declaration defines the development agenda of the Doha 
Round as follows:  
2. International trade can play a major role in the promotion of economic 
development and the alleviation of poverty. We recognize the need for all 
our peoples to benefit from the increased opportunities and welfare gains 
that the multilateral trading system generates.  
The majority of WTO Members are developing countries. We seek to place 
their needs and interests at the heart of the Work Programme adopted in this 
Declaration. 
Recalling the Preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement, we shall continue to 
make positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and 
especially the least-developed among them, secure a share in the growth of 
world trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development. 
In this context, enhanced market access, balanced rules, and well targeted, 
                                                 
34 The United Nations Millennium Development Goals originate from the commitments that 
have been agreed upon with the adoption of the United Nations Millennium Declaration, UN 
GAOR, 55th sess, UN Doc A/Res/55/2 (1998). 
35 The World Bank, above n 5, 2. 
36 Michael J Trebilcock and Robert Howse, The Regulation of International Trade (3rd ed, 
2005) 498. 
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sustainably financed technical assistance and capacity-building programmes 
have important roles to play.37 
Acknowledging that market access improvements alone are not sufficient to 
enhance developing countries’ and LDCs’ participation in the global trading 
system, and to eventually lead them out of poverty, the G-8 leaders recognised 
the need to provide additional Official Development Assistance (ODA) to 
help enhance trade-capacity with regard to training, institutions and 
infrastructure.38 The WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong approved 
this initiative by establishing an ‘Aid for Trade’ package to complement the 
Doha Development Agenda.39 The Hong Kong Declaration called on the 
WTO Director-General to consult with UN agencies, the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the regional development banks, to 
secure additional financial resources.  
Not surprisingly, with the ongoing financial and economic crisis, the Aid for 
Trade programme has not yet accumulated the necessary financial resources. 
Although, according to the report of the WTO Director-General, Pascal Lamy, 
Aid for Trade funds increased by US$4.4 billion to US$25.4 in 2007,40 it is to 
be expected that any further increase is, if anything, going to be significantly 
reduced due to the financial crisis.41 In addition, structural and institutional 
deficiencies prevent the Aid for Trade agenda from becoming an efficient 
instrument to strengthen development countries’ trade capacities.42  
B The July 2008 Package and Beyond 
1 July 2008 Package 
Negotiations on agriculture were close to an agreement when the Doha Round 
came to a standstill in July 2008. Since discussions have been resumed, the 
                                                 
37 WTO Ministerial Declaration adopted at the Ministerial Conference on 14 November 2001 in 
Doha, WTO Doc WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 paras 2–3. 
38 G8 Gleneagles Summit 2005, The Gleneagles Communiqué, para 22 <http://www.g8. 
utoronto.ca/summit/2005gleneagles/communique.pdf> at 6 November 2009. 
39 World Trade Organisation, Ministerial Conference 2005; Doha Work Programme, Doc 
WT/MIN(05)/DEC, (adopted 18 December 2005) para 57 (Ministerial Declaration).  
40 WTO, Report to the Trade Policy Review Body from the Director-General on the Financial 
and Economic Crisis and Trade-Related Developments, (26 March 2009), para 67. 
41 The OECD and WTO will present an updated publication, Aid for Trade at a Glance 2009, at 
the Second Global Review of Aid for Trade to be held on 6–7 July 2009. 
42 For a detailed discussion see Kaufmann and Grosz, above n 17. 
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revised draft modalities for agriculture43 – the so-called July Package – serve 
as a basis for further negotiations.  
According to the draft, domestic support shall be substantially cut in 
developed countries. At the same time, the draft provides for less stringent 
provisions for stockholding related to food security purposes. Income support 
for farmers is still allowed but needs to be decoupled from production levels, 
in other words provided in the form of direct payments. 
As for market access, tariffs will be cut according to a formula that prescribes 
higher cuts to higher tariffs. The cutting of tariffs in developing countries will 
amount to two thirds of that in developed nations. In the food security context 
it is important that developing countries may also profit from less stringent 
reductions for special products, that is, products with a crucial importance for 
a country’s development. Moreover, a Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM), 
which was designed to protect poor farmers by allowing countries to impose a 
special tariff on certain agricultural goods in the event of an import surge or 
price fall, is implemented in the draft.  
Finally, all forms of export subsidies in developed countries are to be 
eliminated by the end of 2013. The draft confirms the members’ commitment 
to maintain an adequate level of food aid by proposing a new article 10.4 on 
international food aid in the AoA.44 For price stabilisation purposes it suggests 
a new type of intergovernmental commodity agreement.45 
The July Package leaves many important issues open and addresses others 
only insufficiently. With regard to market access, all attempts to clearly define 
the triggers for having recourse to the SSM failed. Similarly incomplete are 
the suggested provisions on domestic support, which do not adequately 
address key developments such as trade in biofuels. In addition, the problem 
of subsidised farmers in developed countries is not solved by limiting support 
to direct payments. Financial support will still lead to negative impacts on 
markets for food in developing countries. Furthermore, no progress for food 
security can be anticipated to flow from the suggested rules and disciplines for 
export subsidies because, despite the striking lack of correlation between food 
aid and food crises, no measures have been envisioned to increase the level of 
food aid to those in need. Finally, the complexity of export restrictions on 
food is not addressed, although such restrictions have become common in 
countries where food riots endanger political stability and call for visible 
                                                 
43 WTO Committee on Agriculture – Special Session, WTO Doc TN/AG/W/4/Rev.3 (10 July 
2008)(Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture). 
44 Ibid Annex L para 1. 
45 Ibid para 92. 
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action. Excluding the issue with reference to the limited mandate of the Doha 
Round not only seems cynical but, given the long term effects of export 
restrictions on consumers worldwide, also lacks logic.  
2 Attempts to overcome the deficiencies of the July 
 Package 
A revised draft of the July Package was circulated on 6 December 2008. Its 
goal was to promote discussion of open issues and of the agenda for future 
proceedings which were to take place at a Ministerial conference in December 
2008.46 The draft focused on the emerging consensus regarding the 
formulation of a general framework and acknowledged the need for further 
discussion on outstanding issues. Given that cotton had become the ‘litmus 
test’ of the negotiations, substantial commitments by the European Union and 
the United States were thought to pave the way for a constructive dialogue 
with affected countries such as India. Yet, despite these promising 
developments, not all countries showed the political will to support an 
agreement. As a result, the Director General of the WTO decided to cancel the 
Ministerial conference.  
Since then, several important political developments have taken place. 
Elections in India and a new administration in the United States will have an 
impact on the dynamics of the Doha Round. At the time of writing of this 
article, a first round of consultations on agriculture had been initiated by the 
Chair with members and stakeholder groups such as the G-20 in February 
2009. The goal was to identify the specific issues which countries are 
concerned about in order to define the agenda for future discussion and then 
to revive the traditional format of multilateral – ‘Room E’ – negotiations.47  
C Further Efforts 
Notwithstanding the slowly moving negotiations in the Doha Round, the 
discussion on food security and agricultural trade has not come to a standstill. 
The ‘Cordoba Declaration on the Right to Food and the Governance of the 
Global Food and Agricultural System’ was launched on the occasion of the 
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47 WTO, Statement of Chairperson Falconer, 12 February 2009 <http://www. 
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60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.48 In its 
preamble the Cordoba Declaration admits ‘that conventional approaches to 
food security have failed’. It suggests that ‘food security for all must be 
considered as a global public good and it must be made a central focus of 
global governance as well as of national development’.49 Furthermore, the 
Cordoba Declaration presents a number of issues and recommendations that 
should be addressed in further work on chronic hunger and the aggravation of 
the food crisis. According to the Cordoba Declaration,  
States should … revise policies and practices to guarantee that the food 
insecure and vulnerable groups in their society can feed themselves directly 
from productive land or other natural resources, or have the means for the 
procurement of adequate food. They should also avoid policies and 
practices that prevent other States from being able to do so.  
Moreover it states that  
the international community should be ready to provide assistance, when 
necessary, in order to enable States to meet these priority obligations. 
Agriculture, food security and the right to food should be given priority in 
national, regional and international development plans and poverty 
reduction strategies.50  
To implement these recommendations the Cordoba Declaration contains 
suggestions for international cooperation, the promotion of small-scale 
farming, for reaching coherence with human rights and for the realisation of 
the right to food.51 Overall, the Cordoba Declaration demonstrates how a 
human rights-based approach to food can offer strategies to address the 
structural causes of hunger and contribute to food security for all.  
UN agencies responsible for dealing with the problem of high food prices met 
in Madrid in January 2009. The purpose was to accelerate the progress toward 
the first MDG and to address the effects of price fluctuations on vulnerable 
populations.52 Participants were deeply concerned ‘by the negative impact on 
food access and availability fluctuations exacerbated by the current financial 
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crisis on the livelihoods of the poorest, most vulnerable in the world’.53 
Participants were determined to ensure access to adequate food for all in a 
sustainable manner, to improve nutrition, to stimulate food production, to 
strengthen social protection systems, and to increase investment in all areas 
related to food security.54 This is intended to be achieved by actions in line 
with the Comprehensive Framework for Action (CFA).55  
The CFA was generated by the High Level Task Force on the Global Food 
Crisis in July 2008. It contains suggestions for enabling the poor and 
vulnerable groups to deal with the current food crisis and for longer term 
resilience-building.56 To meet the immediate needs of vulnerable populations, 
the CFA proposes four key policies: First of all, emergency food assistance, 
nutrition interventions and safety nets are to be enhanced and made more 
accessible. Second, smallholder farmer food production is to be boosted and 
trade and tax policies are to be adjusted. Furthermore, macroeconomic 
implications are to be managed. To build resilience and contribute to global 
food and nutrition security in the longer-term, additional critical policies have 
been put forward: The social protection systems are to be expanded and the 
pace of increasing food availability for smallholder farmers is to be sustained. 
Finally, access of developing countries to international food markets is to be 
improved and an international biofuel agreement is to be developed.57 
An important step was also announced by the president of the UN General 
Assembly, Miguel D’Escoto Brockmann, on 18 October 2008. This was the 
establishment of a commission of experts to review the workings of the global 
financial system, including those of major bodies such as the World Bank and 
the IMF, and to suggest steps to be taken by member states to secure a more 
sustainable and just global economic order.  
This Commission of Experts on Reforms of the International Monetary and 
Financial System is chaired by Joseph Stiglitz. In its 2009 report, the 
Commission emphasises the importance of improving coherence between 
policies governing trade and finance.58 The focus lies on developing countries 
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with their need for policy frameworks to protect them from regulatory and 
macro-economic failures in systemically significant countries.59 Furthermore, 
the Commission points out the danger of protectionism which can 
significantly distort open and fair trade.60 According to the Commission, 
‘there are … a number of measures that have already been agreed in 
multilateral trade negotiations which could be implemented rapidly to support 
developing countries impacted by the crises’. Above all, the Commission 
claims that the agreement reached at the WTO Ministerial Conference in 
Hong Kong concerning the elimination of all forms of developed country 
export subsidies by 2013 should be implemented immediately. In addition, 
binding commitments on special and differential treatment for developing 
countries need to be included in the package.61 To sum up, the Commission 
calls for a ‘true development round’. This development round should create a 
legal framework for international trade which strictly promotes agricultural 
and economic growth in developing countries.62 
In sum, food security and international trade remain issues of concern for the 
international community, regardless of the outcome of the Doha Round.  
V FOOD SECURITY AND DOMESTIC LAW: THE EXAMPLE 
 OF BIOFUELS 
When it comes to existing domestic regulations on food security, there are 
essentially four sets of policies: export subsidies, price support, export 
restrictions and reduced taxes and tariffs on food. A look at recent data shows 
that export restrictions and food subsidies have increased substantially in the 
months to April 2009.63 In order to illustrate the complex relationship between 
different sets of norms and interests, the example of subsidies for biofuels will 
be briefly discussed below.  
A Biofuels, the Future of Agriculture? 
As a response to rising oil prices and the lack of alternative fuels for transport, 
Brazil, the European Union, the United States and several other countries are 
actively supporting the production of liquid biofuels. The most important 
biofuels today are ethanol and biodiesel. Ethanol is produced primarily from 
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63 FAO, above n 15, 110. 
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sugar cane and maize and, to a far lesser degree, from wheat, sugar beet and 
cassava. For the production of biodiesel mostly rapeseed, but also palm oil, 
soybean oil and jatropha is used. The global ethanol production is dominated 
by sugar cane from Brazil and maize from the United States, China, the 
European Union and India are other significant ethanol producers. In energy 
terms, ethanol accounts for almost 90 per cent of the current total global 
biofuel use. Biodiesel, mostly produced and used in the European Union 
(predominantly from rapeseed) and increasingly in Southeast Asia (from oil 
palm), provides the remaining share. Ethanol has represented about 10 per 
cent of world consumption in recent years, with Brazil being the main 
exporter. The most important consumer markets are the United States and the 
European Union.64 Obviously, least-developed countries are not yet involved 
in the production of biofuels.    
In 2007, around 23 per cent of US maize production and 54 per cent of 
Brazil’s sugar cane production was used to produce ethanol. In the European 
Union, about 47 per cent of vegetable oil production was used in the 
production of biodiesel, necessitating higher imports of vegetable oil in order 
to meet domestic consumption needs. In energy equivalence, the ethanol share 
of the gasoline transport fuel market in these countries is estimated at 4.5 per 
cent for the United States, 40 per cent for Brazil and 2.2 per cent for the 
European Union. The biodiesel share of the diesel transport fuel market is 
estimated at 0.5 per cent for the United States, 1.1 per cent for Brazil and 3.0 
percent for the European Union. According to the International Energy 
Agency, there seems to be an upward trend in biofuel usage. Biofuels are 
predicted to meet 2.3 per cent of world road-transport fuel demand by 2015 
and 3.2 per cent by 2030.65 Such developments open new perspectives for 
agriculture, and, not surprisingly, it has been argued that the future of 
agriculture lies in the production of crops for biofuels. As a result, it is 
essential to analyse the impact of the production of biofuels on food security.   
B The Impacts of Biofuels on Food Security  
Although expanding demand for biofuels is only one of many factors 
underlying the recent food price increase,66 the rapid growth in biofuel 
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production will affect food security at the national and household levels 
mainly through its impact on food prices and incomes. In terms of the four 
aspects of food security (availability of food, access to food, stability of 
supply and access, and safe and healthy food utilisation), the discussion 
focuses on the impacts of higher food prices on availability and access at the 
national level, as well as at the household level. In the medium to longer term, 
higher agricultural prices offer the potential for a supply response by setting 
incentives to increase production and for strengthening and revitalising the 
role of agriculture as an engine of growth in developing countries.67  
1 National Level 
At the national level, a criterion for food security is the availability of food. 
How individual countries will be affected by higher prices will depend on 
whether they are net agricultural commodity importers or net exporters. While 
some countries will profit from higher prices, the Net-Food-Importing 
Developing Countries are expected to be significantly worse off as they 
depend on imports due to the deficit in agricultural trade that they have 
experienced over the last 20 years.68 For these low-income countries in 
particular, the higher import prices will significantly increase food import 
bills, since food imports are predicted to more than double between 2000 and 
2030.69 
2 Household Level 
Even if biofuels are only one of the several sources of recent increases in food 
prices, expanded biofuel production will still continue to exert upward 
pressure, especially on domestic food prices, for a considerable time to come. 
In the short run, these higher agricultural commodity prices will have 
widespread negative effects on household food security. Particularly at risk 
are poor urban consumers and poor net food buyers in rural areas, who tend 
also to be the majority of the rural poor. Their incomes, which are on average 
significantly lower than those of the urban populations, are insufficient to buy 
the food which they do not produce themselves.70  
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There is a strong need to establish appropriately designed and targeted safety 
nets to ensure access to food by poor and vulnerable groups. Options include 
special cash transfers to the poor and vulnerable populations which support 
their purchasing power without altering domestic incentives to produce more 
food. With this approach, transfers are not reducing the incomes of poor food 
sellers.71 Examples of cash or near-cash transfers are, in the majority of cases, 
linked to specific requirements with regard to income, location, occupation or 
sending children to school. A role model for such systems is the ‘Bolsa 
Família Program’, which is supported by the World Bank and cited as one of 
the key factors behind the positive social outcomes achieved by Brazil in 
recent years.72 However, in low-income countries with weak administrative 
capacities cash transfers may not be feasible.73 
Another possible means of ensuring household food security is the lowering 
of domestic food prices. Measures to lower domestic prices include reducing 
tariffs and other taxes on key staple foods. Many countries impose tariffs on 
food imports to encourage domestic production and increase domestic 
income. When food prices are high, reductions in tariffs and taxes can provide 
some relief to consumers, yet at a fiscal cost. The income loss from reducing 
tariffs can be significant, and the fiscal implications of a combination of tariff 
reduction with additional social protection expenditures may require cutbacks 
in other areas.74  
Other countries continue to maintain high tariffs to protect domestic 
producers. However, such high tariffs negatively affect the large majority of 
the poor, who are net consumers. To cope with the resulting household food 
insecurity, several countries have a long history of using bread or grain 
subsidies specifically targeted to poor and vulnerable groups.  
A further option is the introduction of consumer subsidies for staple foods. 
The risk with such measures is that they can generate high fiscal costs. 
Moreover, if consumer subsidies are met by measures to keep producer prices 
low, the result may be a disincentive for domestic food producers. The only 
exception is when price controls are explicitly introduced as a temporary 
measure and are widely felt to be justifiable in terms of a higher social goal. 
                                                 
71 The World Bank, above n 66, 3–4. 
72 Poor families with children receive an average of R$70.00 (about US$35) in direct transfers. 
In return, they commit to keeping their children in school and taking them for regular health 
checks: The World Bank, Bolsa Familia; Changing the Lives of Millions in Brazil (2009) 
<http://go.worldbank.org/M4EQDZNQX0> at 17 April 2009. 
73 The World Bank, above n 66, 3. 
74 Ibid 4 (figure 2). 
252 DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 14 NO 2 
In such cases, the risks of an aggravation of food insecurity will be 
minimised.75 
In sum, while there are many options to protect the poor and vulnerable 
populations, there is no ‘one size fits all’ solution. Instead, governments in 
affected countries need to tailor specific programmes according to the need of 
their populations.  
C Biofuels Crop Production as a Trigger for 
 Agricultural Growth 
In the longer run, growing demand for biofuels and the resulting rise in 
agricultural commodity prices can present an opportunity to promote 
agricultural growth and rural development in developing countries, with 
potentially positive implications for economic growth, poverty reduction and 
food security. Many of the world’s poorest countries are agro-ecologically 
well placed to become major producers of biofuels. The most promising 
regions for the production of biofuels are Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia, 
Latin America and the Caribbean.76 However, it requires strong government 
commitment to enhance agricultural productivity, for which public as well as 
private investments in infrastructure, institutions and technology, among other 
factors, are crucial. The FAO has tabled an investment road map to 2015 and 
assessed its potential benefits. This assessment suggests that a total annual 
investment volume of US$30 billion in these areas would create an overall 
annual benefit of US$120 billion.77 Other studies have shown that a one-
hectare farm requires an investment volume of about US$200 to produce an 
additional food yield of one to two tons with a market value of approximately 
US$450.78  
Supportive policies must focus above all on enabling poor small producers to 
expand their production and gain access to markets. Involving these 
smallholder farmers in biofuel feedstock production is important for reasons 
of equity and employment. In order to promote smallholder farmers, 
governmental policy intervention is required, especially in the form of 
sponsorship for innovative approaches to rural finance and through the 
enforcement of contracts. A noteworthy example is the ‘Social Full Stamp’ 
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programme created by Brazil’s government to encourage biofuel producers to 
purchase feedstock from small family farms. It promotes the inclusion of 
smallholder farmers in the biofuel production chain, generating employment 
and higher income for this social group.79 The participation of smallholder 
farmers in the form of contract farming seems to be the most effective 
approach to building the necessary market while safeguarding staple food 
production and ensuring agricultural growth. However, its success will 
depend on the existence of an enabling policy and legal framework.80    
Opportunities for developing countries would expand with the removal of 
subsidies and trade barriers that support producers in the member countries of 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) at the 
expense of producers in developing countries. Biofuel development in OECD 
countries has been promoted and supported by governments through a wide 
range of policy instruments. Such instruments include subsidies and tax 
incentives. Several countries are subsidising investments in infrastructure and 
transportation. Tariff barriers for biofuels are also widely used by the major 
ethanol producers to protect domestic agriculture and biofuel industries, to 
support domestic prices of biofuels and to provide an incentive for domestic 
production.81 According to the FAO, the removal of these tariffs and subsidies 
would induce a decline in global ethanol production and consumption of 
about 10–15 per cent. This would lead to a significant increase in imports in 
currently protected markets, while production and exports from developing-
country suppliers would be boosted.82 
D Assessment 
The introduction of biofuel production to developing countries brings not only 
opportunities but also risks. This is why a more consistent set of policies and a 
better legal framework for the production of biofuels is needed. Biofuel 
policies must be protective of poor and vulnerable populations. At the same 
time, they should enable agricultural growth, both by improving economic 
and technical efficiency and by ensuring that developing countries can 
participate in future market opportunities. Furthermore, they need to be 
outward-looking and market-oriented so as to reduce existing distortions in 
biofuel and agricultural markets and avoid introducing new ones.  
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Biofuel feedstock production would lead to an introduction of cash crops to 
the rural regions in developing countries. This may encourage private 
investment in infrastructure, institutions and technology, from which 
eventually also food crop production and other farm activities could benefit. 
Where farmers have access to bank credits, investments and equipment, they 
are able not only to boost their incomes but also to intensify food production 
on their lands.83 This would lead to an increase in employment. In terms of the 
employment effects of the production of biofuels, Brazil is a good example. 
The biofuel sector created about one million jobs in 2001. These jobs were in 
rural areas and mostly for unskilled labour. The indirect creation of 
employment in manufacturing and other sectors was estimated to amount to 
another 300 000 jobs.84 
Needless to say, the expansion of biofuel production will lead to greater 
competition for land. As a result, female farmers (and other smallholder 
farmers) who mostly have weak land-tenure rights, may be excluded from 
biofuel production and even be displaced. In most developing countries, there 
are significant gender gaps in land-tenure rights. For instance in Cameroon, 
women undertake 75 per cent of the agricultural work but they own only 10 
per cent of the land. Additionally, the chance for women to receive bank 
loans, which is essential for increasing productivity and adapting to change, is 
significantly low in most developing countries. Therefore, many women do 
not have the opportunity to participate in the production of biofuels.85 Policies 
and legal frameworks are necessary to enable female farmers to participate in 
the new markets. 
Above all, indigenous communities may be particularly vulnerable.86 Often 
their land rights are not guaranteed by the government as they should be 
according to the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.87 An 
example of forced displacements in the context of biofuel production is the 
eviction of Afro-Colombians in Colombia.88 To prevent smallholder farmers, 
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women and indigenous communities from being displaced, efficient policies 
and a strong legal framework are required.  
VI  CONCLUSION: WHICH WAY FORWARD? 
Food security raises many legal issues. It involves several legal dimensions, 
both with regard to disciplines and levels of regulation. Thus it involves trade 
law, agricultural law and human rights law, and it involves law on the 
domestic and the international level.   
To mitigate the short term effects of the current crises on food security, 
domestic policy is essential. As the example concerning biofuels shows, there 
is a strong need to establish appropriately designed and targeted safety nets to 
ensure access to food for poor consumers in urban areas and poor net food 
buyers in rural areas. It is also crucial to lower domestic food prices or to 
subsidise the poor – in compliance with international trade law – to cope with 
household food insecurity. Domestic policy also needs to focus on enabling 
smallholder farmers to expand their production and gain access to markets in 
order to participate in the supply response and profit from higher prices. 
Sustainable results can only be achieved if the interests of the most vulnerable 
– the poor, minority groups, women and children – are in the long term 
addressed at the international level. If trade is to substantially contribute to 
development and the realisation of food security for all, it needs to allow for 
more flexibility to developing countries. Above all, the three pillars of the 
AoA should be enforced, especially in the OECD countries, to give 
developing countries the opportunity to become fully-fledged participants in 
the benefits of international trade and agricultural development.  
The necessary changes will not happen automatically. Instead, the legal 
framework needs to be enforced in order to implement food security for all. In 
the words of Pascal Lamy, Director General of the WTO: 
the benefit of trade opening for human rights is not automatic. It 
presupposes rules that are both global and just. Rules of the kind that 
prompted Lacordaire to say that ‘between the weak and the strong, poor and 
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the rich ... , liberty is the oppressor and the law is freedom’. Negotiating and 
implementing such rules is the WTO’s basic mission, and its primary 
vocation in so doing is to regulate and not to deregulate as is often 
thought.89 
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